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Abstract 
 
Markets are incomplete when the assets available to the agents do not span the space of future 
contingencies. Efficiency is then assessed by the weak criterion of "constrained efficiency" (efficiency 
relative to the set of allocations compatible with the asset structure). That criterion requires firms to 
optimise relative to shadow-prices reflecting shareholders’ preferences. Yet, even when firms do so, 
competitive equilibria on the markets for assets and commodities fail (generically) to be constrained 
efficient (section 3). Pareto-superior allocations can be implemented through price/wage rigidities and 
quantity constraints (section 4). But nominal rigidities are conducive to multiple equilibria, implying 
endogenous macroeconomic uncertainties that compound the primitive (exogenous) uncertainties (section 
5). Various policy implications can be drawn, which are of some relevance to the current crisis. 
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1. From Borch’s theorem to incomplete market economies. 
Borch’s theorem is the beautiful, transparent statement of a basic 
property of efficient risk-sharing among a set of agents. Let N agents 
each be endowed with a random wealth prospect xi of known 
probability distribution, and with preferences representable by the 
expectation of a concave function of wealth; then, every efficient risk-
sharing arrangement calls for pooling all risks and sharing the 
aggregate wealth X = Σi xi among all the agents. The share of the 
aggregate risk borne by each agent is allowed to vary with the level of 
that risk, reflecting individual risk-tolerances (a property of the utility 
functions). (Borch 1960.) 
In Borch’s 1960 paper, reference is made to the equally general result 
in Arrow (1953), where random prospects are defined with reference to 
an underlying set of S exogenous states of the world. A wealth 
prospect is then defined by an S-vector of state-dependent wealth 
levels. The preferences of an agent are assumed representable by a 
concave function of such vectors. Arrow’s theorem states that every 
efficient risk-sharing arrangement corresponds to a competitive 
equilibrium on the S markets for claims contingent on the states (for 
“Arrow securities”). It is readily verified that Arrow’s efficient 
arrangements satisfy Borch’s theorem. 
Borch’s research was motivated by reinsurance problems. He noted 
modestly that these provide a unique application of Arrow’s model, 
which otherwise would miss an empirical counterpart: markets for 
contingent claims are not common, and opportunities for risk sharing 
remain limited in today’s world. 
Within advanced economies, substantial programs of mutual insurance 
of individual risks are organised through social security 
(unemployment insurance, health insurance, pensions,…) and through 
progressive income taxation. In large federal nations (US, Canada, 
Germany..), there is partial mutualisation of regional (state) risks – like 
40% in the US and Canada, more in Germany. But across nations, there 
is almost no risk-sharing3, in spite of the fact that aggregate national 
                                                
3  An immediate corollary of Borch’s theorem asserts that efficient global risk-sharing 
could be organised on a two-tier basis, with individual risks pooled efficiently within 
nations or regions, and aggregate national or regional risks pooled at an upper tier; see 
e.g. Drèze (2000) or Drèze (2009) for an application to Belgium’s constitutional debate. 
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risks (say, uncertainty about the evolution of average real disposable 
incomes per capita) remain substantial in the long run and are 
imperfectly correlated.4 This shortcoming is related to the absence of 
assets indexed on national incomes. Existing assets traded on stock 
exchanges account only for a few percentage points of national 
incomes.5 Clearly, the extent to which Borch’s theorem applies remains 
limited – in spite of the remark in Borch (1968) that incomplete 
markets entail incentives for the agents to create additional assets. 
The reference to uncertainty about the evolution of national incomes is 
important, because it points to the obvious fact that many relevant risks 
are of a macroeconomic nature, hence largely endogenous. Today 
(spring 2009), there is much uncertainty about the likely depth and 
duration of the recession currently under way. This is quite different 
from, say, exogenous uncertainty about the size of Norway’s oil 
reserves or about the speed of global warming…  
When assessing the extent of organised risk-sharing, it is important to 
understand the nature of risky activities and to draw some distinctions. 
In the Borch model, and in the exchange version of Arrow’s model, 
risks are given: each agent is endowed with a given state-distribution 
of wealth, and risk-sharing calls for redistribution of these 
endowments, neither more nor less. 
A different problem arises in production economies, where the state 
distribution of wealth tomorrow can be, to some extent, chosen through 
production decisions (investments). Thus, a simple model of a 
production economy endows firms with production sets linking outputs 
tomorrow to inputs today. The firm then chooses a state-dependent 
production plan from a convex feasible set. In that case, the state-
distribution of returns is effectively chosen by the firm. This raises a 
new set of problems, discussed at length below. 
A third level of complexity arises when agents exert some control over 
the occurrence of the states. Models with that feature are commonplace 
in the theory of individual decision making. For instance, they enter the 
                                                
4  Thus, Forni and Reichlin (1999) estimate that prospects for international risk-sharing 
across member states of the European Union are comparable to those implemented across 
states in the US or Canada. 
5  In his introdution to a general appraisal of market incompleteness, Shiller (1993, p. ix) 
notes: “..corporate dividends amount to .. about 3% of national income in the United 
States”.  
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insurance literature under the name of moral hazard. But they are not 
standard in general equilibrium theory.  
 
2. A basic model. 
2.1 Primitives. 
Throughout this lecture, I rely on the simplest model suitable for 
discussing incomplete markets (see also Table 1). It concerns a 
production economy extending over two periods under uncertainty with 
no markets for contingent claims and a limited (“incomplete”) set of 
assets. Incomplete markets imply that households face multiple budget 
constraints and firms’ profits do not have well-defined market values.  
There are two explicit periods: the present (today), or period 0, and the 
future (tomorrow), or period 1. There is a single “state of the 
environment” or “state of the world” in period 0 and there are S 
possible states s = 1,..,S in the future. Which state will obtain tomorrow 
is unknown today. Let S = {0, 1,..,S} denote the set of nodes. 
The economy consists of H + J + 1 agents: H households indexed h ε 
H = { 1,..,H}; J firms indexed j ε J = {1,..,J} and a bank indexed 0. 
There are L physical goods or commodities both in period 0 and in 
period 1, state s; they are indexed sl ε {s1,..,sL}, s ε S. There is one 
money, used for transaction purposes by households and firms, 
according to a general transactions technology introduced below. 
Money holdings are denoted ms, s ε S. Money balances are supplied by 
the bank at the (here exogenous) rates of interest rs, s ε S. The bank is 
owned by the households with given ownership fractions θh0 . Its profits 
are denoted rsMs, s ε S.6 
The assets consist of a safe nominal bond and the shares of stock of 
the J firms. The assets are traded by households alone. Holdings of 
bonds by household h are labelled bh ε R, with initial holdings equal to 
0. Shares of firm j held by household h are labelled θhj ε R+, with initial 
holdings δhj, Σh δhj = 1 for each j. 
Spot markets for commodities operate in period 0 with prices p0 ε RL+ 
and in period 1 with prices ps ε RL+, s = 1,..,S. Shares of the firms are 
traded in period 0 on a  stock market with prices π ε RJ+. Bonds, which 
                                                
6  The modelling of money here follows Drèze and Polemarchakis (2001), with a slight 
generalisation suggested by Jean-Jacques Herings and an extension to distinct interest 
rates for bank loans and safe bonds. 
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pay one unit of money in every state s tomorrow, are traded today at a 
price ϕ ε [0, 1]. 
Household h is defined by a vector of initial endowments wh and a 
consumption-and-transactions correspondence Ξh(p) ⊂ R(L+1)(S+1) that 
defines the feasible set of consumptions and money holdings at given 
prices p7. (Cash-in-advance is a transparent illustration, but the 
specification here is more general.) The preferences of household h are 
given by a preference relation ≥h on Ξh. 
Firm j is similarly defined by a production-and-transactions 
correspondence Ψj(p) ⊂ R(L+1)(S+1) that defines the feasible productions 
and money holdings at given prices8.  
 
2.2 Constrained feasibility. 
The budget constraints of household h are defined by:  
                           
p0(xh0 – wh0) + r0mh0 + π(θh  - δh) + ϕbh ≤ Σjθhj(p0yj0 + r0mj0) + θh0r0M 
                    (2.1) 
ps(xhs – whs) + rsmhs ≤ bh + Σjθhj(psyjs + rsmjs) + θh0rsMs, s = 1,..,S.     (2.2) 
 
There are thus altogether S+1 distinct budget constraints, one per node. 
A household facing these constraints can reallocate (monetary) 
resources over time and across states exclusively through its portfolio of 
assets (θh, bh). Markets are said to be “complete” when portfolio 
choices permit unlimited reallocations, so that the S+1 constraints (2.1)-
(2.2) boil down to a single one. Define the values of “dividends” paid 
by firm j in state s as Vjs := psyjs  + rsmjs, an element of the J x S matrix 
V. Taking the existence of nominal bonds into account, add to the 
matrix V a row of 1’s, and label V+ the resulting (J+1) x S matrix. 
Markets are complete if and only if V+ has full rank S. This can only 
happen if J+1 ≥ S and S rows of V+ are linearly independent. These are 
clearly strong requirements, hence the relevance of the “incomplete 
markets” case that arises when rankV+ < S. 
Thus, the asset structure defined by V+ entails constraints on (defines) 
the set of consumption plans attainable by the households: there should 
exist prices and portfolios for which conditions (2.2) are satisfied, all h.  
                                                
7  Prices come in because the money balances needed for the trades xh-wh depend upon p. 
8  Because inputs are negative quantities, money balances used by firms are also negative.  
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Definition D.2.1. A constrained feasible allocation is a tuple 
((xh, mh) ε Ξh(p), h ε H, (yj, mj) ε Ψj, j ε J) such that there exist (p, θ, b) 
for which (2.2) is satisfied with 
 Σh(xh – wh) - Σjyj ≤ 0               (2.3.1)      
M = Σhmh - Σjmj                (2.3.2)  
Σhθ
hj = 1, j ε J, and Σhbh = 0.             (2.3.3) 
      
Condition (2.3.1) states that the allocation must be physically feasible. 
Condition (2.3.2) imposes that the sum of money balances held by all 
agents corresponds to the amount issued by the bank; it is thus akin to a 
physical feasibility condition for “bank notes”. Condition (2.3.3) 
amounts to clearance of the asset markets. Together with (2.2), it 
implies that the allocation is decentralised through the portfolios (θh, 
bh) and prices (p, r): the consumption of each household is financed in 
every state tomorrow by the endowment and portfolio returns of the 
household. That is, the definition of constrained feasibility embodies 
the limitations on transfers of resources across states that result from 
market incompleteness (from the structure of the assets). Note that, 
although the set of assets is a primitive, their relevant properties (state 
distributions of dividends) are endogenous (production decisions). 
 D.2.1 is a definition of pure feasibility: it allows for transfers of wealth 
across households at node 0, hence the asset prices (π, ϕ) play no role 
(do not appear). Further, D.2.1 incorporates no requirement of 
optimisation by the agents – households or firms. The reference to the 
prices (p, r) is a complication – unfortunate perhaps, but unavoidable to 
capture the crucial feature that not all reallocations of resources across 
states are financially feasible. D.2.1 imposes this, and no further 
requirement. 9 
 
2.3 Constrained efficiency. 
Using D.2.1, a concept of constrained efficiency is at hand. 
 
                                                
9 Definition 2.1 does not place any restrictions on admissible prices (beyond non-
negativity). Thus, by setting all prices equal to 0, the constraints (2.2) become irrelevant, 
and full Pareto efficiency is at hand. Under the constraints on prices introduced in Section 
5, that possibility no longer exists.  
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Definition D.2.3 The tuple ((xh, mh), h ε H, (yj, mj), j ε J,) is a 
constrained efficient allocation if it is constrained feasible and there 
does not exist another constrained feasible allocation strictly preferred 
to it by every household.10 
 
The concept of constrained efficiency is of course weaker than first-
best (Pareto) efficiency. In the model under discussion, the two 
coincide when markets are complete – or else when restrictive 
assumptions hold, assumptions that are so extreme as not to deserve 
attention. Conversely, constrained inefficiency is a much stronger 
property than first-best inefficiency. It is accordingly of great interest 
to investigate whether market equililbria are constrained efficient.  
 
3. Constrained inefficiency of market equilibria. 
3.1 .Preliminaries. 
In a seminal paper, Diamond (1967)11 studied an economy where L = 1 
and where the production sets entail no choice other than scale: the 
state-distribution of outputs is a given function of the input level12. He 
could then prove that competitive equilibria on the asset markets are 
constrained efficient. This nice property follows from the fact that 
production decisions are implicitly taken by households: their demands 
for shares determine the input levels, hence the full production plans. 
In general, production decisions are more complex, and a definition of 
the decision criterion of firms is called for. This is not a trivial task: as 
noted above, market incompleteness entails that profit maximisation is 
not well defined. Indeed, when rankV+ < S, the asset prices do not 
imply unique prices for state-specific dividends (for “Arrow securities” 
promising one unit of money contingent on a given state s = 1,..,S). 
For the model under discussion, two approaches to equilibrium analysis 
have been developed, namely General Equilibrium with Incomplete 
markets (GEI) and Temporary General Equilibrium (TGE)13.  
                                                
10  Because transfers of wealth in period 0 are allowed, this is equivalent to the more 
standard “preferred or equivalent for every household, with strict preference for at least 
one of them”. 
11  That seminal paper was the first to introduce the concept of constrained efficiency. 
12  Diamond’s model has been extended some by Ekern-Wilson (1974), Radner (1974). 
13  For a comparison of the two approaches, see e.g. Magill and Shafer (1991) or Drèze 
(1999b). GEI started with Radner (1968), whereas modern TGE was first introduced by 
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Under GEI, it is assumed that (i) all spot markets clear at competitive 
prices, and (ii) all agents hold common and correct point expectations 
about spot prices in every state tomorrow.14 One can then try to 
characterise the production decisions that are compatible with 
constrained efficiency, under that specification. The virtue of GEI for 
normative analysis is that the approach permits focusing on the 
potential implications (for constrained efficiency) of market 
incompleteness per se, when other potential sources of inefficiency 
(like imperfect information about future prices) are assumed away.  
In contrast, TGE develops the more realistic approach based on 
idiosyncratic price expectations. That is clearly the relevant starting 
point for positive analysis. It is adopted in section 5 below. Prior to that 
however, it is useful to state the main lessons of the normative analysis 
permitted by GEI. 
 
3.2 Constrained efficient production decisions. 
A characterisation of constrained-efficient production decisions in the 
model under discussion was first stated in Drèze (1974), for the special 
case L = 1.15 The extension to L > 1 appears in Geanakoplos et al. 
(1990) and in Bonnisseau and Lachiri (2004). In either case, the 
characterisation is reasonably transparent.  
Under competitive spot markets, the production decisions of a firm 
affect households in two ways: (i) through a state-distribution of 
dividends; and (ii) when L > 1, through a possible impact on 
commodity prices. If markets were complete, the state distribution of 
dividends would be valued in the market, and the second theorem of 
Welfare Economics would apply, calling for profit maximisation at 
given prices. Drèze and his followers show that constrained efficiency 
calls for profit maximisation at shadow prices reflecting the valuation 
of dividends by shareholders. Denote by λhs the marginal rate of 
substitution of household h for dividends in state s versus dividends 
today. The shadow price βjs to be attached by firm j to profits 
(dividends) in state s is defined by βjs = Σhθhjλhs. Profit maximisation by 
                                                
Grandmont (1974) at a conference held in Bergen in 1971. (The TGE idea goes back to 
Hicks 1939) 
14 Clearly, the assumption of “perfect foresight” goes way beyond “rational” expectations 
à la Muth (1961). 
15 Drèze’s paper was presented first at the 1971 conference in Bergen. 
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all firms at shadow prices averaging final shareholders’ shadow prices 
is a necessary condition for constrained efficiency.16 
 
Remark 3.2.1 When markets are complete, the individual marginal rates of 
substitution are all equal to the market prices for dividends, and we are back to 
straight profit maximisation – as was to be expected. When markets are 
incomplete, the stock and bond prices still carry some implications that are 
reflected in the marginal rates of substitution of shareholders through the first 
order conditions for optimal portfolios. There is no need for firms to take them 
into account separately. 
Remark 3.2.2 The individual rates λhs are multiplied by the shareholdings θhj, 
reflecting the fact that dividends accrue to shareholders in proportion to their 
holdings. The formula recognises this feature. Note that the formula relies on 
terminal shareholdings θhj, not initial shareholdings δhj. This feature emerges as a 
necessary condition for constrained efficiency, reflecting the fact that dividends 
will accrue to the final holders. But who is deciding about the production plan, the 
initial or the final shareholders? This depends upon the sequence in time of the 
production decisions and the clearing of the stock market. In the equilibrium 
analysis, there is an implicit assumption of simultaneity, calling for consistency 
between stock prices and production decisions – for instance through an 
adjustment process of the kind studied in section 5 of Drèze (1974). 
 
3.3 Generic constrained inefficiency. 
 The formula for shadow prices given above characterises neatly a 
necessary condition for constrained efficiency. It invites a conjecture: 
with perfect foresight, competitive clearing of spot markets today and 
tomorrow, coupled with profit maximisation at the shadow prices given 
above - “stockholders’ equilibria” in Drèze’s terminology - could be 
conducive to constrained efficiency in the economy under discussion. 
Unfortunately, such is not the case. Drèze (1974) gives robust examples 
to the contrary. The main theorem in Geanakoplos et al. (1990) gives 
non-pathological assumptions under which stockholders’ equilibria are 
generically constrained-inefficient! (Generically, i.e. “almost always” - 
with reference to initial endowments in that paper.) So there should 
                                                
16  It is also a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency of the production plan from the 
viewpoint of the firm’s shareholders; in that sense, it is amenable to decentralisation. 
 11 
exist Pareto superior constrained feasible allocations that are not 
competitive   equilibria – i.e. failure of the two welfare theorems.17 
This property will not surprise readers familiar with the general 
theorem of the second best, stated as follows by Lipsey and Lancaster 
(1956): “The general theorem for the second best optimum states that if 
there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which 
prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other 
Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer 
desirable.” At stake here is a natural extension of this general theorem 
from Pareto efficiency to constrained efficiency: when first-best 
allocations are not attainable, we may expect some of their properties, 
like competitive market clearing, to be no longer desirable… 
A general result to the effect that stock market equilibria are 
gener(ic)ally inefficient, not only with reference to a first-best Pareto 
criterion, but also with reference to what can be accomplished when 
insurance possibilities are limited (when Borch’s theorem does not 
apply) is a striking warning about the limitations of market 
capitalism. It is a timely warning, both given the liberal creed that has 
been prevalent over the pas twenty years (since the fall of the iron 
curtain), and given the current crisis that originated in the proliferation 
of “toxic assets” (about which more in section 3.5) The result should 
thus be understood properly. 
In the model of Drèze (1974) with L = 1 (so that commodity prices are 
trivially given), constrained-inefficient stockholders’ equilibria are 
potentially dominated by alternatives that differ with respect to both 
production plans and portfolios. Indeed, portfolios are optimal given 
the production plans, and these plans are optimal given the portfolios; 
but simultaneous changes in portfolios and plans can be Pareto 
improving. The fact that a necessary condition (the decision criterion of 
the firms) is satisfied does not imply that the condition is sufficient. 
Indeed, it is not, because the set of constrained-feasible allocations is 
not convex: the dividend incomes entering tomorrow’s budget 
constraints are defined as products of endogenous variables, namely 
θhj(psyjs + rsmjs). This bilinearity results in a non-convex feasible set, 
                                                
17 An early example appears in Plolemarchakis (1979). A general result appears in 
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986). A recent further contribution is Herings and 
Polemarchakis (2005). 
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over which necessary conditions for optimality are not sufficient. When 
a stockholders’ equilibrium is not constrained-efficient, simultaneous 
changes in θ’s and y’s can be Pareto improving. But bringing these 
about is not a trivial task, because the simultaneous changes must be 
identified as Pareto improving. This may call for communication 
between a firm and households that are not currently shareholders. No 
specific suggestions to that effect have appeared in the literature, to the 
best of my knowledge.18 Hence my interest in a positive theory of the 
firm, needed for section 5. 
 
Remark 3.3.1 The generic result in Geanakoplos et al. assumes that spot 
markets for commodities clear at competitive prices, both today and tomorrow; 
Pareto improvements come from the assets only (production plans and portfolios). 
A complementary result, not available in the literature, would take as given the 
decision criterion of the firms and the competitive clearing of the asset markets, 
but allow for non-competitive allocation of the commodities. I conjecture that a 
generic inefficiency result similar to that in Geanakoplos et al. holds for that 
alternative specification, as illustrated in section 4. 
Remark 3.3.2 A further comment about generic inefficiency is in order. The 
assumptions leading to the theorem in Geanakoplos et al., though “non-
pathological”, are still restrictive.19 Does “genericity” matter? Yes and no… If 
some of these assumptions fail, it does not follow that any stockholders’ 
equilibrium is efficient! There is no guarantee that it is inefficient, only that it 
could be. The concern about potential inefficiency is there, and it remains 
advisable to investigate measures apt to generate Pareto-improvements.  
 
3.4 A positive theory of firms’ decisions. 
It was noted above that “constrained efficiency calls for profit 
maximisation at shadow prices reflecting the valuation of dividends by 
shareholders”.  
In the case of a firm run by a single owner, that decision criterion is 
natural and realistic: the owner simply values state-distributions of 
dividends through his or her expected utility for wealth – full stop.20 
                                                
18  Bisin et al. (2009) assume that firms know the values attached by every household to 
every element of their production sets; that is a rather extreme and gratuitous 
assumption… 
19  In particular, there is an unnatural assumption about the relative numbers of states and 
agents. 
20  The distinction between alternative ownership structures is developed more fully in 
Magill and Quinzii (1996). 
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In the case of a firm run by a few partners, agreement among them 
about production decisions is in sight. If they entertain divergent 
degrees of risk aversion, or different state-dependent preferences, some 
compromises are called for. Possibly they may introduce transfers or 
other compensations to reach unanimity. The underlying principle of 
“Pareto efficiency for the shareholders” is a natural agenda for the 
partnership. 
Of course, firm ownership by a single or a few partners is unlikely to 
prove efficient from the viewpoint of risk sharing. 
When it comes to corporations, with shares widely disseminated 
among anonymous shareholders, the situation is quite different. Today, 
these corporations are typically controlled by a board of directors, 
elected by and accountable to the general assembly of shareholders. 
Outside of exceptional circumstances, that assembly would typically be 
attended by a few shareholders only, with some proxies.21 
The situation just described is captured quite faithfully in a decision 
criterion that I have labelled the control principle. It was introduced 
first in my 1983 Yrjö Jahnsson Lectures, with a non-technical 
presentation in my Harry Johnson Lecture (1984); see Drèze (1989, 
1985). It goes as follows:  
(i) each firm is endowed with by-laws (a primitive) that 
stipulate how directors are selected from among 
shareholders; 
(ii) a production plan y is preferred to the alternative plan y’ if 
and only if it is preferred by all members of a set of 
shareholders holding a majority of shares and including all 
directors. 
This definition leads to a partial ordering of production alternatives, 
thereby opening the door to multiple equilibria - a theme addressed in 
section 5. 
The definition of equilibrium of the firm requires that the chosen 
production plan y is such that there does not exist a feasible y’ preferred 
to y. Existence of equilibrium follows from standard assumptions, plus 
                                                
21  Exceptional circumstances: after the Government rescued Belgium’s largest bank 
(FORTIS) in 2008, several assemblies witnessed lively proxy fights with large 
attendance… 
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a weak condition of continuity on the definition of the board of 
directors.22 
The decision criterion reflecting this “control principle” has received 
very little attention in the literature. Still, I claim that it remains to date 
the more general and more realistic formulation of a decision criterion 
for business firms under incomplete markets.23 The realism should be 
obvious. The generality results from encompassing the “shareholders 
efficiency” condition of section 3.2 by simply defining the board of 
directors to consist of all shareholders (perhaps with transfers or vote 
trading); and from encompassing such standard formulations as “the 
utility function of a manager” – as in Radner (1968) - by simply 
defining the board as consisting of that manager alone. Also, the 
criterion is readily extended to allow for partial delegation of 
responsibilities, for absentee ownership, a.s.o..  
 
Remark 3.4.1 There remains one delicate issue about reliance on the control 
principle, an issue related to that raised in Remark 3.2.2. On which basis are the 
board of directors and the general assembly formed: initial shareholders (δh’s), or 
final shareholders (θh’s)? If initial shareholders, then the composition of the board 
and of the assembly are part of the primitives, which is a simplification; but then 
one must take into account the fact that initial shareholders choosing production 
plans will realise that they may trade shares on the period 0 stock exchange. In 
that case, they are concerned not only about future dividends, but also about 
trading prices. Thus, an initial shareholder intending to sell her shares will favour 
a production plan apt to bring about a high selling price, even if the underlying 
dividend profile does not appeal to her; and conversely for a prospective buyer. 
This calls for forming expectations about the impact of future state-dependent 
dividends on today’s stock prices, a further difficulty. 
In the spirit of developing a theory susceptible of multiperiod extensions, the 
“initial shareholders” approach is the right one. It was introduced for the first time 
in the important paper by Grossman and Hart (1979), together with the 
assumption that each shareholder h uses her own marginal rates of substitution λhs 
                                                
22  The composition of the board is endogenous, because it reflects stock ownership as 
resulting from clearing of the stock market. The continuity condition states that the 
mapping defining the board of directors as a function of the vector of shareholdings by 
the H households must be upper hemi-continuous in the discrete topology. Transparent 
examples include the n largest shareholders, the smallest set of shareholders holding 
together α percent of the shares, every shareholder holding at least β percent of the 
shares, and more.  
23  The criterion is developed in Drèze (1989) for L = 1; an extension to L > 1 is described 
in section 5. 
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to evaluate the impact of dividends in state s on asset prices today. The authors 
label that assumption “competitive price perceptions”. Unfortunately, that label is 
deceptive. As explained in detail by Drèze et al. (2007), the Grossman-Hart 
assumption goes beyond competitive perceptions: it imposes “egocentric price 
perceptions” that do not, in general, correspond to rational expectations. Drèze et 
al. use a more general definition. There is no room here to treat that technical 
issue more fully; hence, it is also eschewed in section 5. 
 
3.5 A digression: “toxic” assets. 
It is intriguing to wonder whether the proliferation of so-called “toxic 
assets” over the last decade relates in any way to the generic 
inefficiency of stockholders’ equilibria. Although the term “toxic 
assets” does not appear in the economic literature, a close analogue is 
standard, namely “lemons”. An asset may be characterised as a “lemon” 
if there exists another asset (or portfolio) that dominates it: for a 
comparable investment at time 0, that other asset yields (weakly) higher 
dividends in all states tomorrow. Under absence of arbitrage, lemons 
should not exist. Conversely, existence of lemons reflects information 
failures. 
In Drèze et al. (2008), information asymmetries are introduced through 
incomplete information on the part of firms about shareholders’ 
preferences, and on the part of shareholders about production plans24. It 
is then shown (through robust examples) that such asymmetries may 
lead to proliferation of lemons. And information asymmetries (as under 
securitisation of mortgages…) provide a natural explanation for the 
proliferation of toxic assets.  
 
4. Non-competitive spot-market clearing. 
In the general model (L > 1), relative prices enter the picture, and open 
new avenues towards Pareto improvements (as noted in Remark 3.3.1). 
The principle is elementary: suitably chosen commodity prices offer 
additional prospects towards risk-sharing, when markets are incomplete 
(when Borch’s theorem does not apply).  
Take a country like Ivory Coast whose GDP consists substantially of 
coffee production. World coffee prices are volatile, and there are no 
                                                
24 Technically, this is done through investment funds that do not detect lemons: they hold 
the same fraction of all firms in a given sector; the analogy to funds pooling toxic 
mortgages is close… 
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markets for trading claims on the country’s GDP. Futures markets for 
coffee exist for short terms only, and renewing options continuously is 
impractical and expensive. Also, these markets do not offer insurance 
on uncertainties about production levels. Stabilising the world price of 
coffee (possibly with some inventory management) would reduce 
substantially the uncertainty affecting the country’s prospective GDP. 
That is, price rigidities offer an alternative for insurance or asset 
trading.25 
In a previous lecture devoted to incomplete markets (Drèze 2001), I 
devoted a section to the theme: “Incomplete markets breed wage and 
price rigidities”. That theme has both a positive dimension and a 
normative dimension.  
On the positive side, I noted that downwards price rigidity in the 
presence of excess capacity is often due to fixed costs, costs that must 
be covered state-by-state under incomplete markets;26 this calls for 
average rather than marginal cost pricing, a form of price rigidity.27 I 
also note that under monopolistic competition and risk aversion, 
uncertainty about demand elasticity introduces a kink in perceived 
demand, which entails price stickiness.28 
On the normative side, privileged here, one application has retained 
much attention, namely wage rigidities. For instance, Drèze and Gollier 
(1993)29 show how, in a stylized version of the model of section 2, 
wage rigidities permit Pareto improvements upon competitive 
stockholders’ equilibria.30 
                                                
25 My own interest in equilibria with price rigidities (Drèze 1975) arose from 
considerations of Marcel Boiteux  about the merits of price rigidities over time in the face 
of demand fluctuations for electricity (with emphasis on investment decisions by users). 
26 General equilibrium with fixed costs is studied in Dehez and Drèze (1988) and Dehez et 
al. (2003). 
27 The illuminating analogy is with peak-load pricing, under which fixed costs are fully 
covered through the excess of marginal over average cost at peak periods; see Drèze 
(1964). Under uncertainty, this would call for covering fixed costs under favourable states 
only, and transferring surpluses to other states through asset trading – if markets 
permitted! 
28 On this point, see Drèze (1979b). See also Drèze and Herings (2008) for a general 
equilibrium model with kinky perceived demands. 
29 That paper builds upon preliminary considerations in Drèze (1979a, 1989) and Gollier 
(1991). 
30 The Pareto improvements emerge in Drèze-Gollier from allowance for upward wage 
rigidity in states exceptionally favourable to labour. 
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It is not claimed that wage rigidities alone can restore full constrained 
efficiency, in a general model. But it is important to realise that they 
permit Pareto improvements, if properly defined. The importance 
derives from the prevalence of downward nominal wage rigidities in 
contemporary advanced economies. A prima facie case for Pareto 
improvement is linked to the current (spring 2009) crisis. Without 
downward rigidities, market wages would drop to reservation levels, 
and labour incomes would fall appreciably – with severe consequences 
for workers’ welfare, for further mortgage failures, and then for 
aggregate demand and employment.  
The argument in Drèze and Gollier is reasonably transparent. Insurance 
of labour income risks is at the same time highly desirable and severely 
limited. It is desirable, because labour incomes are seldom open to 
diversification. In the words of James Meade (1972): “While property 
owners can spread their risks by putting small bits of their property into 
a large number of concerns, a worker cannot put small bits of his effort 
into a large number of different jobs”. Of course, labour contracts31 
offer scope for risk sharing between a specific firm and its employees. 
But the main point, and the starting point of the Drèze-Gollier paper, is 
that prospective entrants or re-entrants32 to the labour market are not 
covered by such contracts. This is a severe limitation to the extent of 
risk sharing between workers and property owners. Downwards wage 
rigidities coupled with unemployment benefits provide an avenue 
towards limiting the risks affecting labour incomes.33 It is conducive to 
Pareto improvements, if the loss in productive efficiency is more than 
compensated by the gain in ex ante risk sharing efficiency.   
Relying upon a model derived from the well-known Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM), Drèze and Gollier derive (i) a sufficient 
condition for constrained inefficiency of a stockholders’ equilibrium 
(Proposition 2); then (ii) a characterisation of constrained efficient 
allocations (Proposition 3). I shall not enter here into details of that 
work. I simply wish to record the conclusion that, under quite general 
                                                
31  For an introduction to the theory of labour contracts, see the seminal papers by 
Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974) and Gordon (1974), or the account in Drèze (1990). 
32  Entrants: today’s graduating students; re-entrants: inactive workers (including young 
mothers), prospective victims of lay-offs, a.s.o.. 
33  As explained in Drèze (1979a), labour income insurance without minimum wages 
would be impractical. 
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conditions, downward wage rigidities can help improve upon 
constrained inefficient equilibria – especially when coupled with 
unemployment benefits. 
The Drèze-Gollier model is real, so the rigidities are also real. In 
practice, however, indexation of wages on the nominal price level is 
rare (with Belgium a notable exception). Thus, downward nominal 
wage rigidities provide the natural starting point, also for my section 5. 
But assessing the significance of nominal rigidities calls for unveiling 
their implications for the underlying real wages that permit improved 
risk sharing and thus address the real concerns. 
 
Remark 4.1 Inspired by the above considerations, I have explored various 
avenues of potential improvements on prevailing modes of wage formation. These 
include (partial) indexation of wages on national income per capita – Drèze 
(1990) -, indexation of social security contributions on business conditions – 
Drèze (1993) – or even time sharing – Drèze (1986). I have also extended the 
model of section 3 to labour contracts – Drèze (1989, chapter 3). There is no 
space here to develop these themes. 
 
5. Multiple equilibria. 
5.1 Some general results. 
Economies subject to price/wage rigidities share an important property: 
they are prone to exhibit a continuum of quantity-constrained 
equilibria reflecting coordination failures. 
This property was first brought out by Roberts (1987), who considered 
the intriguing case where the rigid prices or wages are compatible with 
a competitive equilibrium.34 Although the (real) economy studied by 
Roberts is quite special35, an extension of his multiplicity result for a 
standard Arrow-Debreu economy is given in Drèze (1997), following 
Herings (1996). The equilibrium concept used by Roberts (and Drèze) 
is known as a “supply-constrained equilibrium”.36 Under that concept, 
(some) prices are subject to lower bounds, and quantity constraints on 
                                                
34  The possibility of quantity-constrained equilibria at competitive prices was first 
brought out by Hahn (1978). 
35  All firms operate under constant returns to scale; all households are initially endowed 
with productive inputs supplied to firms and not consumed; consumption preferences are 
homothetic. 
36  That specific concept was introduced by van der Laan (1982), building upon the work 
of Drèze (1975). Although Drèze and van der Laan consider a pure exchange economy, 
the extension to production appears in Dehez and Drèze (1984).  
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individual net supplies come in when (and only when) the downward 
rigidities are binding. The main theorem in Drèze (1997) reads as 
follows: “Given an arbitrary strictly positive vector s of individual 
supply constraints for the commodities subject to downward price 
rigidities, there exists a supply-constrained equilibrium with constraints 
s° ≤ s.” That result is further strengthened in Citanna et al. (2001) 
where it is shown that there exists a continuum of supply-constrained 
equilibria with arbitrary severe rationing of supplies. Although 
availability of inputs sets an upper limit to output, there is no lower 
limit (as we might experience tomorrow?); hence multiplicity manifests 
itself as underutilisation of resources. In special cases, the alternative 
equilibria are Pareto-ranked. 
An intuitive explanation of these results is stated as follows by Citanna 
et al. (p. 170): “We fix the prices of a subset of commodities, LII in 
number. This freezes LII – 1 relative prices. But we allow rationing of 
the supply of these LII commodities. This leaves one degree of freedom, 
corresponding to the overall level of rationing for these LII commodities 
and to the level of flexible prices relative to the LII fixed prices… If 
firms expect that the total demand for their output is low, then they will 
hire only a limited amount of labour. Workers, expecting to be 
(partially) unemployed … express low demands for commodities, 
thereby confirming the firms’ expectations.” (It is only too easy to 
interpret the last two sentences in terms of today’s situation… with 
privileged reference to the automobile industry!) In other words, 
underemployment equilibria may quite generally be interpreted as 
coordination failures.37 
The work under review concerns real economies, for which multiplicity 
of allocations is a “real” phenomenon. The monetary model of section 
2, expanded to complete markets, has been studied by Drèze and 
Polemarchakis (2001). These authors show that, under homogenous 
transactions technologies and in absence of initial monetary 
commitments, there exists a continuum of equilibria with identical 
allocations but arbitrary price levels at each node - hence arbitrary 
inflation rates between today and state s tomorrow. That is, under 
                                                
37  Other forms of coordination failures are studied, e.g. by Cooper and John (1988) or 
Jones and Manuelli (1992). Note that multiple equilibria reflecting coordination failures 
are not “sunspot equilibria”; on this concept, see e.g. Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986). 
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complete markets, both inflation rates and inflation variability across 
states have no real consequences, under the stated assumptions.38 The 
multiplicity of real allocations in the previous paragraphs is of a 
different nature. The two specifications are combined in section 5. 
These results show that the static general equilibrium model must 
imperatively be complemented by a specification of a selection process 
through which a specific equilibrium emerges. The more natural 
complement is a dynamic process of short-run adjustment with initial 
conditions inherited from yesterday and with expectations about future 
realisations evolving along the process. In the absence of price 
rigidities, this calls for a positive theory of inflation.39 There is not 
much general equilibrium literature on dynamic adjustment with price 
rigidities; see however Drèze (1991b, 1999a). There is of course a rich 
macroeconomic literature; the link remains to be formalised. 
 
Remark 5.1.1 These results stand in apparent conflict with earlier work by 
Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978) or Laroque (1981) who display sufficient 
conditions for local uniqueness of equilibria with fixed prices. The explanation 
rests with model formulation and assumptions. The more recent papers use a 
different (and hopefully less restrictive) framework. In the same way that I 
explained in Remark 3.3.2 why genericity is not of paramount significance, I note 
here that existence of a continuum of supply-constrained equilibria (which 
requires suitable assumptions) is not paramount either. Again, the concern about 
coordination failures is the main point, which may stand under weaker conditions. 
 
5.2 A TGE model with price/wage rigidities. 
In order to connect these general results to market incompleteness, I 
have studied properties of the economy defined in section 2 above 
under downward nominal rigidities of prices or wages.40 For the 
positive analysis of that economy, I rely on the Temporary General 
Equilibrium (TGE) approach, and I adopt the more relevant decision 
criterion for firms defined by the “control principle” (section 3.4). That 
work is of necessity quite technical, but basic features can be described 
as follows (with summary in Table 2). 
                                                
38  Of course, under incomplete markets, inflation variability has real consequences.  
39  On this topic, see also Drèze (1993a). 
40  My research covers real as well as nominal rigidities, but I concentrate here on nominal 
rigidities to alleviate an already arduous exposition. This section is based upon the more 
general formulation in Drèze (2013). 
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The L commodities are partitioned into two sets, LI and LII. The prices 
of commodities in LI are flexible; the prices of commodities in LII are 
subject to downward nominal rigidities. At time 0, for each l in LII, I 
impose pl0 ≥ pl0. When a price pl0 = pl0, the supply of that commodity 
by households and firms is subject to quantity constraints, defined for 
each agent by a continuous function of a global rationing index σl0 (an 
endogenous, market variable). That is: 
xhl0 – whl0  ≥ lh(σl0) ∀ h ε H,   yjl0 ≥ lj(σl0) ∀ j ε J.       (5.1)                                   
The levels of the variables lh(.), lj(.) are part of the signals observed by 
the agents.41 Tomorrow in state s the lower bounds pls are allowed to 
depend (continuously) upon today’s market realisations. Analogues of 
conditions (5.1) prevail, with rationing indices σls. Henceforth, (5.1) 
stands for the whole set of such constraints, with 0 replaced by s ε S. 
The information of the agents consists of the signals ξ0 = (p0, r0, σ0, π, 
ϕ), ζ0 = V0 : = (V00, V10 ,..,VJ0)  at node 0, then ξs = (ps, rs, σs), and ζs = 
Vs  in state s, where Vjs := psyjs + rsmjs denotes the dividends from firm j, 
and V0s = rsMs denotes the dividend from the bank.  
The household decision, denoted dh = (dh0(ξ0), dhs(ξs, ζs)). consists of 
demands today dh0 = (xh0, mh0, θh, bh) and of a plan for demands 
tomorrow dhs = (xhs, mhs) in all states as functions of the signals (ξs, ζs) 
observed then. It must satisfy dh ε Ξh(.), the budget constraints (2.1)-
(2.2) and the quantity constraints (5.1). Tomorrow’s decision dhs 
maximises a conditional utility uh(dh0, dhs) subject to (2.2). 
Having observed (ξ0, ζ0), household h forms expectations about the 
signals (ξs, ζs). I assume that, given (ξ0, ζ0), the relevant expectations 
on the occurrence of state s and associated signal (ξs, ζs) are defined by 
a (subjective) probability measure ψh(ξs, ζs⎜ξ0, ζ0).  
Then, given a decision dh0, household h has a well-defined expected 
utility  
Uh(dh0⎜ξ0, ζ0) = Σsψh(ξs, ζs⎜ξ0, ζ0) uh(dh0,  dhs(ξs, ζs)).             (5.2)  
The household problem is to maximise Uh(dh0⎜ξ0, ζ0) w.r.t. dh0 subject to 
(2.1). Under strong continuity assumptions on ψh(.), that problem is 
well-behaved, and the optimal decisions (dh0⎜ξ0, ζ0) constitute an upper 
                                                
41  To illustrate: σl0 may denote the overall rate of unemployment for unskilled labour; the 
quantity of labour that household h can sell is a function of that rate (possibly defined by 
a random drawing over all unemployed unskilled workers). 
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hemi-continuous correspondence from the space of (ξ0, ζ0) to the space 
of dh0. I write Ph(dh) for the set of decisions dh’ preferred (strictly) by h 
to dh. 
Turning to firm j, I first add to the primitives a set Ij  ⊆ {h ε H ⎢δhj > 0} 
that defines the control group of firm j. Firm j is assumed to select a 
feasible decision dj = (dj0, djs(ξs)) such that there does not exist an 
alternative feasible decision dj’ which is preferred to dj by a set of 
shareholders containing Ij and holding together at least 50% of the final 
shares. 
This invites me to define shareholders’ preferences over the decisions 
of firms. These decisions affect final shareholders solely through the 
dividends issued both in period 0 and in period 1, state s = 1,..,S. So I 
need to define shareholders’ preferences over streams of dividends Vj 
:= (Vj0, Vj1,..,VjS). I assume that such preferences are defined taking as 
given the signals (ξ0, ζ0), h’s portfolio (θh, bh) and h’s expectations 
ψh(ξs⎢ξ0, ζ0). These preferences may then be represented by an indirect 
utility function for income streams vh and signals ξ. := (ξ1,..ξS), where 
vh = (vh0, vh1,..,vhS), vh0  = p0wh0 + Σjπjδhj + ΣjθhjVj0 + θh0r0M0 and vhs = 
pswhs + ΣjθhjVjs + bh + θh0rsMs, s = 1,..,S. Write Λhs for that indirect 
utility given state s and Λh for its expectation, expressed as   
Λh(vh⎜θh, bh, ξ0, ζ0) := Σs ψh(ξs⎜ξ0, ζ0) Λhs(vh0, ξ0, vhs, ξs/ θh, bh).  (5.3) 
In comparing the dividend streams Vj and Vj’, household h will prefer  
Vj’ if and only if          
Λh(vh + θhj(Vj’ – Vj), ξ) > Λh(vh, ξ).        (5.4)  
Applying the control principle, a feasible decision dj’ is preferred by 
firm j to the feasible decision dj if and only if there exists a set of 
shareholders, holding at least 50% of the shares and containing Ij, such 
that dj’ is preferred to dj according to (5.3) by every member of that set. 
And I write Pj(dj) for the set of decisions preferred by firm j to dj. 
After tediously listing these definitions, I can now define: 
 
Definition 5.1 A temporary equilibrium is a tuple ((dh) h εH, (dj) jεJ , ξ0) 
such that: 
(a) ∀ h, dh ε Ξh(.) and Ξh ∩ Ph(dh) is empty; 
(b) ∀ j, dj ε Ψj(.) and Ψj ∩ Pj(dj) is empty; 
(c) Σh(xh0 – wh0) ≤ Σjyj0 and M0 = Σhmh0 - Σjmj0; 
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(d) ∀ l ε LII, pl0 ≥ pl0 implies xhl0 – whl0 > lh(σl0) ∀ h and    yjl0 > 
lj(σl0) ∀ j; 
(e) Σh bh = 0 and ∀ j Σhθhj = 1. 
 
5.3 An inflation-unemployment locus. 
The following theorem (here stated informally) is a first transposition to 
temporary equilibria of results mentioned in section 5.1. Let u denote 
an average rate of underutilisation of all resources  (all: an “output 
gap”, combining underutilisation of capacities as well as unemployment 
of labour), and let i denote the overall inflation rate at period 0.  
 
Theorem 5.1. Under standard assumptions on the primitives of the 
economy, and strong assumptions of continuity on the households’ 
probabilistic expectations, for every A in R++, there exists a 
temporary equilibrium with  
   (1 - u) . (1 + i) = A.      (5.5)      
 
A suggestive special case occurs when price rigidities are not binding, 
as could for instance be the case for high enough overall price levels, 
say A > A*. In that special case, formula (5.5) allows for u = 0, with i 
and A co-determined (i = A – 1) with a level given by whatever process 
of nominal price formation is at work. A then simply stands for the 
ratio of today’s price level to yesterday’s price level – thus reminding 
us of the need to complement the static equilibrium theory with a 
positive theory of inflation (as also noted at the end of section 5.1). 
Conversely, if i were determined by some process of nominal price 
formation, then u and A would be codetermined with u = 1 + A(1 + 
i)-1 inversely related to today’s price level – as could be expected under 
nominal price rigidities. The multiplicity of equilibrium values for u 
would then result from the arbitrariness of A (of the extent of 
coordination failures). 
In general, theorem 5.1 asserts existence of a set of temporary 
equilibria with a combination of underutilisation of resources and of 
inflation indexed by a parameter A. A would then reflect both initial 
conditions (including yesterday’s price level) and the expectations 
about future realisations that underlie the decisions and preferences of 
the households at time 0 given their information (ξ0, ζ0). The level of A 
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should thus reflect the working of a short-run adjustment process 
selecting a specific equilibrium. That selection may yield a more or less 
attractive allocation, possibly linked to a coordination failure, as 
mentioned in section 5.1. The selection process should also entail a 
process of expectation formation. But the multiplicity under (5.5) 
complicates that task. In particular, rational expectations must take 
into account the potential multiplicity of equilibria. That is, rational 
expectations are bound to be multi-valued. 
It is not asserted that the set of equilibria characterised by (5.5) forms a 
continuum (is connected); but it is implied by the formula that they are 
generally distinct, hence genuinely multiple.42 Again, it is not asserted 
that they can be Pareto-ranked. All this reflects the “temporary” nature 
of my research in progress. 
Formula (5.5) has an intriguing implication: it allows for two distinct 
tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment! Indeed: 
- keeping A fixed, u and i can move in parallel, either increasing 
(stagflation) or decreasing (recovery) together; 
- under variations of A, u and i can (yet need not..) move in 
opposite directions (Phillips curve). 
The existence of both possibilities is confirmed empirically, as vividly 
illustrated by figure 2. (In contrast, only the second case is allowed 
under the fashionable New Keynesian Phillips curve.) This feature 
illustrates my claim – in Drèze (1987c) and passim – that it may be 
more fruitful to look for the macroeconomic implications of 
microeconomics than for the microeconomic foundations of 
macroeconomics… But the link to macroeconomics remains to be 
spelled out fully. 
A comment is in order on the role of incomplete markets in 
understanding demand volatility. Drèze (2001) contains a section 
entitled “Incomplete markets breed demand volatility”, where I refer to 
changes in the degree of uncertainty embodied in the agents’ 
expectations (as when the prospects of bankruptcy for automobile 
manufactures rise…). I note that uncertainty about future resources 
typically induces households to save more, as shown by Drèze and 
                                                
42  In the special case u = 0, the (competitive) real equilibrium can be unique, but 
sustained by alternative price levels. With u > 0, identical real equilibria at different 
price levels would require special conditions on primitives. 
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Modigliani (1972) or Sandmo (1970). At the same time, according to 
the theory of Investment under Uncertainty due to Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994), investments are undertaken when the net present value of the 
associated profit stream is greater than the value of an option to carry 
out the same investment at a later date. Because the option value 
increases with the degree of uncertainty, an increase in that degree (as 
experienced in 2008!) encourages postponement of investment: the 
associated loss is of second order, the gain of first order!43 These 
arguments would not apply under complete markets. Thus, incomplete 
markets breed demand volatility, reflected in multiple equilibria44, 
hence in multivalued expectations, and calling for policies apt to 
steer the short-run adjustment mechanism in the desired direction while 
reducing the uncertainty about future realisations; that is, while 
anchoring expectations.45 
At the same time, the multiplicity has an undeniable flavour of realism: 
as we wonder today about the growth rates of western economies over 
the coming months, the existence of a full range of possibilities is 
flagrant and inescapable! Which econom(etr)ic model embodies all the 
contingencies apt to influence these growth rates (including, for 
instance, “changes in the degree of uncertainty”)?  
 
Remark 5.3 The multiplicity result in Theorem 5.1 should be invoked with 
caution. The result is obtained under a flexible price (interest rate) for bonds. If 
the bank (or the “treasury”) controlled the bond rate through open market 
operations, the result would no longer follow from the maintained assumptions – 
though it would probably remain valid under natural assumptions about the 
elasticity of price expectations (w.r.t. today’s prices). As already hinted in 
remarks 3.3.2 and 5.1.1, I do not regard it as essential to prove a result like 
Theorem 5.1 with full generality. What matters most is to recognise that 
coordination failures are a genuine possibility, of which we should be conscious 
at all times, even if they do not occur all the time. 
                                                
43 The reasoning is analogous to that underlying the “menu cost” theory for price 
adjustments; see e.g. Mankiw (1985). 
44  The close association between volatility of investment and volatility of GDP is 
illustrated in figures 1.a and 1.b. 
45  There is an obvious  analogy with monetary policy aimed at controlling today’s 
inflation (as resulting from short-run adjustment) while anchoring inflation expectations. 
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6. Conclusion. 
6.a The material collected in this paper is easy to summarise. I have 
imported (or extended) and integrated three key theoretical 
implications of market incompleteness:46 
(i) “competitive” market allocations display generic 
inefficiency, not only relative to unattainable Pareto optima, 
but also relative to constrained optima attainable within the 
existing asset structure; 
(ii) price/wage rigidities offer scope for constrained-feasible 
Pareto improvements over competitive allocations, 
(iii) but are conducive to multiplicity of equilibria, linked to 
coordination failures. 
These three properties, and especially (iii), further imply: 
(iv) a realistic model cannot rest with a description of 
uncertainty through exogenous “states of the world”; it must 
imperatively recognise that a major source of uncertainty is 
associated with macroeconomic developments, which are 
largely endogenous, and over which rational expectations 
remain to be defined;47 
(v) there is a role for macroeconomic policy in anchoring 
expectations and overcoming coordination failures. 
 
6.b These are theoretical implications: I have not claimed any 
empirical, econometric support for my assertions – in spite of being a 
strong advocate of integrating theory and econometrics on the way to 
policy.48 As always, theoretical results are model dependent – there is 
no other way! The model underlying this presentation claims some 
generality: it belongs to the illustrious general equilibrium family 
dating back to Walras, contemporaneously developed by Arrow, 
Debreu, McKenzie and their followers, and more recently extended to 
                                                
46  Implication (i) is at the heart of market incompleteness; (ii) and (iii) follow 
immediately, but also have independent status in economic theory. 
47  It has been claimed, in particular by Kurz (1993), that prices tomorrow belong in the 
definition of the states; see also Drèze (1999c) for a discussion of that claim. The issue 
raised here bears some analogy: do macroeconomic variables (GDP, inflation, 
unemployment..) belong in the definition of the states? The question deserves more 
attention than I could devote to it so far. 
48  To wit: Drèze (1972, 1987b, 1991a). 
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incomplete markets by the GEI and TGE theorists quoted above. At 
first sight, doing general equilibrium theory –as opposed to partial 
equilibrium or aggregate modelling - would justify a claim of full 
generality, not just “some” generality. Why the caution? For a simple, 
obvious reason: the theory remains incomplete in that it deals with 
static, equilibrium theory, leaving out altogether short-run dynamics!49  
Interestingly, my theoretical journey has led me to derive, from 
implications of the initial model, two distinct calls for extensions. The 
first, as just recalled, is the need to complement the equilibrium 
analysis with a specification and analysis of short-run dynamics. The 
second is the need to model uncertainty, not just through exogenous 
states of the world, but also through endogenous macroeconomic 
uncertainties. As recognised above, this has momentous 
methodological as well as substantive implications, starting with the 
need of a suitable treatment of expectations, and hopefully leading to a 
better understanding of the role assets indexed on macroeconomic 
realisations (so-called “macrosecurities”).50 
This theoretical conclusion is vividly illustrated by current concerns: 
our major uncertainty today concerns the depth and duration of the 
recession, not exogenous developments of a physical or purely political 
nature. 
 
6.c My conclusions suggest emphatically that the relevant model for 
eliciting the macroeconomic implications of general equilibrium 
theory is not the standard Walras-Arrow-Debreu model, but the 
incomplete markets model, in its twin versions: GEI, mostly useful 
for normative analysis; and TGE, a must for positive analysis. 
It is unfortunate that incomplete-markets analysis starts with the 
challenge of defining a decision criterion for business firms. The more 
relevant work on that topic, starting with Diamond (1967) and leading 
to the developments listed in section 3 then 5, is not part of today’s 
mainstream thinking, nor even of much current work on financial 
economics.51 It is equally unfortunate that both GEI and TGE are 
                                                
49  The model here remains incomplete in several other respects, the most glaring of which 
include the absence of a public sector and of imperfect competition (due to fixed costs?). 
50 On this last concept, see Shiller (1993). 
51 To wit: such recent books as Tirole (2006) or Demange and Laroque (2006) fail to 
incorporate these developments. 
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technically demanding subjects, a feature that hinders their adoption as 
standard (mainstream) tools. 
And yet, it is difficult to imagine how a proper discussion of policy 
alternatives towards coping with the current crisis could be organised 
in a less demanding framework. Item (i) above is part of the starting 
point to study asset monitoring aimed at avoiding the proliferation of 
lemons (of toxic assets) and at improving the insurance prospects 
offered by asset markets. Item (ii) is part of the starting point to guide 
wage policies in the face of growing unemployment. Items (iii) and (iv) 
are part of the starting point to orient fiscal (and other) policies towards 
promoting recovery (v). 
Of course, much remains to be done, and the key implications collected 
here are just a starter towards a full policy analysis. To illustrate, 
consider the timely issue of choosing the desirable mix of consumption 
and investment under today’s fiscal policy. The current crisis entails an 
unexpected loss of wealth that could meaningfully be spread over 
several generations. That argument invites debt-financed fiscal 
expenditures aimed at sustaining the consumption of those households 
suffering from a loss of income and devoid of the savings needed to 
spread that loss over time.52.That policy transfers to future generations 
the part of today’s loss of wealth corresponding to the correlative 
reduction in private investment (“crowding out” effect). But debt 
financing raises the issue of (partial) Ricardian equivalence – especially 
in those countries, like the EU, where today’s fiscal deficits are 
presented as short-lived, thereby raising concerns about forthcoming 
tax hikes. An answer to that concern might be to concentrate the fiscal 
stimulation on productive public investments whose returns offset the 
debt service.53 But the stimulation of investment does not entail sharing 
today’s losses with future generations… So, what is the desirable 
mix?54 My model in section 5 does not (yet!) include a public sector, 
and does not lend itself naturally to balance the interests of successive 
generations: the GEI approach is better suited to that normative 
end…Clearly, the work presented here remains very much 
“incomplete”…another kind of transfer to the next generations! 
                                                
52 They are also the households whose propensity to consume is highest, a natural 
advantage for effectiveness of fiscal stimulation. 
53 Public housing for low-income dwellers is a front example; see Drèze et al. (1999). 
54 My own inclination would privilege the maximal impact on aggregate demand… 
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Epilogue. 
My conclusion suggests that there exist chapters of economic theory 
whose relative neglect by our profession has co-existed with relative 
neglect of issues relevant to the current crisis; resource allocation under 
market incompleteness, with its corollaries (i)-(iii) in my conclusion, 
falls in that category. 
Of course, in writing that, I am exposing myself to the stricture of being 
self-centred! Indeed, this lecture abounds in self-citations, citations of 
works that have been in the public domain for many years and whose 
relative neglect is perhaps best interpreted as the profession’s verdict on 
their merits… 
My excuse is that I have quoted works that embody relatively 
demanding technical requirements and that cover separate issues 
(investment under uncertainty, price/wage rigidities, multiple 
equilibria) that were not integrated before, to my knowledge – both for 
lack of obvious motivation, and because facing several technical issues 
simultaneously adds another dimension to our theoretical challenges.55  
The responsibility for making technical developments accessible to 
general economists lies with the technical authors. A public lecture 
offers a privileged occasion to bring esoteric material to the attention of 
a broad audience. Many thanks to Karl Borch and NHH for creating the 
current occasion. 
 
                                                
55  My own prior familiarity with these three separate issues is a happy coincidence, partly 
explained in Dehez and Licandro (2005), perhaps also enhanced by career overextension? 
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Table 1: notation for section 2.1. 
 
Time: t = 0, 1. 
States at time 1: s = 1,..,S; S = ⎨ 0, 1,..,S ⎬. 
 
Agents: H households h ε H = ⎨ 1,..,H ⎬ 
              J firms j ε J = ⎨ 1,..,J ⎬ 
      1 bank 0. 
 
Commodities: L commodities indexed ls, l ε L = ⎨ 1,..,L ⎬, s ε S, are 
traded on spot markets at prices p = (p0,..,pS) ε Πs RL+. 
Initial endowments of commodities are wh = (wh0,..,whS) ε R(S+1)L. 
 
Money holdings: mh = (mh0, mh1,.., mhS) ε R(S+1)+ 
      mj = (mj0, mj1,.., mjS) ε R(S+1)- (input sign convention) 
     M = Σhmh  - Σj mj. 
Money balances are supplied by the bank at a cost r = (r0,..,rS) ε R(S+1)+. 
 
Assets: all assets are held by households, not by firms; 
    they are traded on the stock exchange at t = 0. 
    Bond holdings are bh ε R, with price φ, no initial holdings. 
    Shares of stock of the J firms, with prices π ε RJ+, are held in 
amounts θhj ε [0, 1] with initial holdings δhj, Σh δhj = 1 ∀ j. 
 
Firm j chooses a production plan (yj, mj) εΨj(p) ⊂ R(S+1)L x R(S+1)-. 
 
Houshold h chooses, on basis of its preferences ≥h, a consumption plan  
(xh, mh) ε Ξh(p) ⊂ R(S+1)L  x R-(S+1)  and a portfolio (θh, bh) ε [0, 1]J x R 
subject to the budget constraints 
 
0 ≥ p0(xh0 – wh0) + r0mh0 + π(θh  - δh) + ϕbh - Σjθhj(p0yj0 + r0mj0) - θh0r0M0 
            (2.1) 
0 ≥ ps(xhs – whs) + rsmhs – bh - Σjθhj(psyjs + rsmjs) - θh0rsMs, s = 1,..,S. (2.2) 
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Table 2: notation for section 5.2. 
 
There are two sets of commodities: LI with flexible prices 
          LII with downward nominal rigidity. 
At time 0, pl0  ≥ plO ∀ l ε LII. When pl0 = plO, supply rationing sets in, 
through a market parameter σl0.  
The agents observe supply constraints lh(σl0), lj(σl0): 
xhl0 – whl0  ≥ lh(σl0) ∀ h ε H,  yjl0 ≥ lj(σl0) ∀ j ε J.                 (5.1) 
 
At node s ε S, the dividends of firm j are Vjs := psyjs + rsmjs, and the dividends 
of the bank are V0s = rsMs. In vector form: V+s = (V0s, V1s,..,VJs) = (V0s, Vs). 
 
The signals observed by the households at node s are (ξs, ζs), where 
ξ0 = (p0, r0, σ0, π, ϕ), ξs = (ps, rs, σs),  and ζs = V+s, s ε S. Given the signals 
at time 0, household h has expectations about the occurrence of state s 
together with signals (ξs, ζs); these expectations are given by the 
probability measure ψh(ξs, ζs | ξ0, ζ0). 
 
A decision for household h given (ξ0, ζ0), denoted dh(ξ0, ζ0), consists of a 
time 0 component dh0 = (xh0, mh0, θh, bh) and contingent plans 
dhs = (xhs, mhs | ξs, ζs).  
 
Preferences over decisions are represented by their expected utilities 
Uh(dh0⎜ξ0, ζ0) = Σsψh(ξs, ζs⎜ξ0, ζ0) uh(dh0, dhs( ξs, ζs)).      (5.2) 
I denote by Ph(dh) the set of decisions strictly preferred by h to dh. 
 
Given (θh, bh), these preferences also admit representation by an indirect 
utility Λh, a function of the parameters of the budget constraints (2.2). For 
ease of notation, denote the income of h at node s by vhs, where 
vh0  = p0wh0 + Σjπjδhj + ΣjθhjVj0 + θh0r0M0 and  
vhs = pswhs + ΣjθhjVjs + bh + θh0rsMs, s = 1,..,S. 
Write  vh := (vh0, vh1,..vhS), ξ := (ξ1,..ξS). 
Then the indirect utility of (vh, ξ) given (ξ0, ζ0) and (θh, bh) may be 
written as  
Λh(vh, ξ /ξ0, ζ0, θh, bh) := Σs ψh(ξs,ζs /ξ0, ζ0) Λhs(vh0, vhs, ξs/ ξ0, ζ0, θh, bh). 
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Turning to firms, their decisions are similarly defined as dj := (dj0, djs(ξs)). 
Their decision criterion is based on the control principle, with a priori 
given control groups Ij ⊆ ⎨h ε H ⎜δhj > 0⎬. 
 
A household h with θhj > 0 will favour a decision dj’ entailing the dividend 
stream Vj’ over a decision dj entailing the stream Vj if and only if  
Λ(vh + θhj(Vj’ – Vj), ξ) > Λh(vh, ξ).        (5.4)  
 
I write Phj(dj) for the set of decisions by firm j strictly preferred by h to dj; 
and Pj(dj/θ) for the set of decisions by firm j strictly preferred to dj under 
the “control principle” given the share ownership θ. 
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     Figure 1.a 
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          Figure 1.b 
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     Figure 2 
 
 
 
        Figure 3 (1 - u). (1 + i) (United States) 
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